Finally! Getting to the meat of the Washington mythos for me: the Presidency. Blah, blah, Commander-in-Chief during the Revolution. Blah, Blah, Yorktown. Whatever. I’m a political scientist. Give me the gory details of his administration.
And man, were they ever gory. Anyone who thinks that modern politics suffers from a lack of civility and that everything is going to hell in a handbasket really needs to get a sense of perspective from Chernow’s descriptions of Washington’s second term. If the Father of Our Country can’t catch a break from his own Secretary of State (Jefferson), then what hope does anyone else have?
Seriously though, Washington: A Life spends a good amount of time on documenting the development of the two proto-parties in the early U.S. and Washington’s slow slide from a non-partisan figure to the de facto leader of the Federalists. It’s interesting to remember that this is the 1780’s & 1790’s. The U.S. democracy was very much an experiment and the truth of Duverger’s Law wasn’t at all clear. Early U.S. politicians tended to disdain factions or parties, without understanding that they are fundamental to true democratic expression. And that the U.S. was almost destined to become a two-party state – as long as it remained a democracy, of course.
Obviously, the first U.S. parties – the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists/Republicans/Democratic-Republicans – weren’t really parties in the true sense of the term, groups dedicated to aggregating and organizing public opinion and societal interest groups. They were more intellectual cabals. In this case, mostly led by Hamilton for the Federalists and Jefferson for the Anti-Federalists/Republicans.
Chernow does a good job of delving into the parties’ fundamental contradictions in a short amount of time. The Anti-Federalists (who morphed into the Republicans, often called Democratic-Republicans later, and, eventually, the modern-day Democratic Party[1]) were concerned with the overreach of centralized government power. They supported the “voice of the people” over the voice of elites and believed representatives should be delegates rather than trustees. Highly supportive of the French Revolution, they also tended to be southern planters and others deeply involved in profiting from slave labor.
In contrast, Federalists preferred an active central government and prescribed to a more Burkian-trustee philosophy of representation.[2] They also tended to be supported by the trading and banking classes of the North, as well as those in the trades, who owned minimal property. They were ascendant in the early days of the Republic for a number of reasons. First, they had been the driving force behind the creation of the Constitution to replace the failed Articles of Confederation. Secondly, President Washington, while ostensibly not a member of either “party”, his policy positions and decisions favored that party, especially his deference to Hamilton.
It becomes clear, to me anyway, from reading of the early Republic that the U.S. is probably highly “under partied” relative to the number of societal cleavages. The U.S. likely needs more political parties. Probably a lot more. Even in the early days of the country, there were so many factions clamoring for attention and needing representation: abolitionists, southern planters, Quakers and other religious groups, pioneers and settlers in the west, northern trade and manufacturing interests, pro-British, pro-French, freed slaves, etc. And – instead of parties organizing around and collectively pursuing those more coherent interests – a hard, sharp line was drawn between federalists and non-federalists.
This was probably inevitable, see Duverger’s Law, but it happened extraordinarily quickly. Honestly, I’m curious is anyone in political science has done a study on the speed at which parties develop or reach their predicted equilibrium.[3]
Anyway, the two-party split contributed (and continues to contribute) to hyperbole[4] in the media. Benjamin Franklin Brache and Thomas Paine[5] absolutely savaged George Washington in the press, largely because he disagreed with them on the establishment of a national bank and whether to support the (pretty bloody) French Revolution. Probably the nicest thing Paine said during the Washington administration was, “treacherous in private friendship…and a hypocrite in public life.” It went downhill from there. He even questioned Washington’s conduct in the Revolutionary War, which takes serious gumption, but everyone is an apostate to a fanatic.[6]
Hyperbole was (and is) necessary to inflame supporters and maintain the momentum against an opponent or to maintain support for a particular policy. The danger of politics (for a politician) is apathy. It’s not good or bad or a failure of character; it’s just the nature of the beast. And it’s particularly prevalent in two-party systems in which the need for attention on particular issues is narrowly funneled to two set parties. A more parliamentary system might have allowed for the development and growth of ancillary parties, as you see in countries like Israel or Germany. General left and general right parties tend to form, while single-issue or radical parties develop around particular issues and then are brought into a coalition government with the major party that gets the most votes in an election.
Of course, there are endless caveats and whatnot here. But, most importantly, I think, is that the parliamentary system incentivizes action on issues of concern. Coalition partners, particularly the fire-breathing fanatics, demand action for their participation. The balance/separation of powers approach of the U.S. tends to minimize movement on issues. You want to win everything so you can achieve everything through legislation. Small, incremental movement is typical until there is a massive shift in policy at a particular point.
Which tends to anger both the ones that want a major change in policy and those who oppose any policy change. Think of the creep of anti-abortion laws in the last 10-15 years. They have incrementally chipped away at the legality of abortion over the last several decades without outright banning it. Abortion rights activists come down hard on any perceived restriction, while anti-abortion activists always say it isn’t enough and keep wanting more. A SCOTUS ruling or a landmark piece of legislation then marks a turning point in the issue area.
This incentive toward immobility may have helped in the early days of the republic, given how much everything was in flux. Although there was quite a bit of political activity, if only because there was no government following Washington’s election. The main issues may sound esoteric – a National Bank, a treaty with Great Britain, etc. – but they all dealt directly with the nature of the republic being established and had long-term ramifications for the nation.
That’s it for now. I may do a full retrospective when I’m finished (still another 100+ pages) but Washington is about to submit his farewell address – remember, no term-limits in 1796 – so there might not be too much of interest (to me anyway) left to discuss.
[1] Because it wasn’t confusing enough already.
[2] From Edmund Burke’s famous speech, “Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.” Whole text here: http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html. Note the date (1774).
[3] Cox has a really good book, Making Votes Count, if you desperately want to dig into the math and theory behind strategic voting and outcomes.
[4] To put it nicely.
[5] Grandson of the guy you’re thinking of and author of Common Sense respectively.
[6] Chernow rights specifically on this issue in an article from the WSJ in 2010: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704911704575326891123551892
And man, were they ever gory. Anyone who thinks that modern politics suffers from a lack of civility and that everything is going to hell in a handbasket really needs to get a sense of perspective from Chernow’s descriptions of Washington’s second term. If the Father of Our Country can’t catch a break from his own Secretary of State (Jefferson), then what hope does anyone else have?
Seriously though, Washington: A Life spends a good amount of time on documenting the development of the two proto-parties in the early U.S. and Washington’s slow slide from a non-partisan figure to the de facto leader of the Federalists. It’s interesting to remember that this is the 1780’s & 1790’s. The U.S. democracy was very much an experiment and the truth of Duverger’s Law wasn’t at all clear. Early U.S. politicians tended to disdain factions or parties, without understanding that they are fundamental to true democratic expression. And that the U.S. was almost destined to become a two-party state – as long as it remained a democracy, of course.
Obviously, the first U.S. parties – the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists/Republicans/Democratic-Republicans – weren’t really parties in the true sense of the term, groups dedicated to aggregating and organizing public opinion and societal interest groups. They were more intellectual cabals. In this case, mostly led by Hamilton for the Federalists and Jefferson for the Anti-Federalists/Republicans.
Chernow does a good job of delving into the parties’ fundamental contradictions in a short amount of time. The Anti-Federalists (who morphed into the Republicans, often called Democratic-Republicans later, and, eventually, the modern-day Democratic Party[1]) were concerned with the overreach of centralized government power. They supported the “voice of the people” over the voice of elites and believed representatives should be delegates rather than trustees. Highly supportive of the French Revolution, they also tended to be southern planters and others deeply involved in profiting from slave labor.
In contrast, Federalists preferred an active central government and prescribed to a more Burkian-trustee philosophy of representation.[2] They also tended to be supported by the trading and banking classes of the North, as well as those in the trades, who owned minimal property. They were ascendant in the early days of the Republic for a number of reasons. First, they had been the driving force behind the creation of the Constitution to replace the failed Articles of Confederation. Secondly, President Washington, while ostensibly not a member of either “party”, his policy positions and decisions favored that party, especially his deference to Hamilton.
It becomes clear, to me anyway, from reading of the early Republic that the U.S. is probably highly “under partied” relative to the number of societal cleavages. The U.S. likely needs more political parties. Probably a lot more. Even in the early days of the country, there were so many factions clamoring for attention and needing representation: abolitionists, southern planters, Quakers and other religious groups, pioneers and settlers in the west, northern trade and manufacturing interests, pro-British, pro-French, freed slaves, etc. And – instead of parties organizing around and collectively pursuing those more coherent interests – a hard, sharp line was drawn between federalists and non-federalists.
This was probably inevitable, see Duverger’s Law, but it happened extraordinarily quickly. Honestly, I’m curious is anyone in political science has done a study on the speed at which parties develop or reach their predicted equilibrium.[3]
Anyway, the two-party split contributed (and continues to contribute) to hyperbole[4] in the media. Benjamin Franklin Brache and Thomas Paine[5] absolutely savaged George Washington in the press, largely because he disagreed with them on the establishment of a national bank and whether to support the (pretty bloody) French Revolution. Probably the nicest thing Paine said during the Washington administration was, “treacherous in private friendship…and a hypocrite in public life.” It went downhill from there. He even questioned Washington’s conduct in the Revolutionary War, which takes serious gumption, but everyone is an apostate to a fanatic.[6]
Hyperbole was (and is) necessary to inflame supporters and maintain the momentum against an opponent or to maintain support for a particular policy. The danger of politics (for a politician) is apathy. It’s not good or bad or a failure of character; it’s just the nature of the beast. And it’s particularly prevalent in two-party systems in which the need for attention on particular issues is narrowly funneled to two set parties. A more parliamentary system might have allowed for the development and growth of ancillary parties, as you see in countries like Israel or Germany. General left and general right parties tend to form, while single-issue or radical parties develop around particular issues and then are brought into a coalition government with the major party that gets the most votes in an election.
Of course, there are endless caveats and whatnot here. But, most importantly, I think, is that the parliamentary system incentivizes action on issues of concern. Coalition partners, particularly the fire-breathing fanatics, demand action for their participation. The balance/separation of powers approach of the U.S. tends to minimize movement on issues. You want to win everything so you can achieve everything through legislation. Small, incremental movement is typical until there is a massive shift in policy at a particular point.
Which tends to anger both the ones that want a major change in policy and those who oppose any policy change. Think of the creep of anti-abortion laws in the last 10-15 years. They have incrementally chipped away at the legality of abortion over the last several decades without outright banning it. Abortion rights activists come down hard on any perceived restriction, while anti-abortion activists always say it isn’t enough and keep wanting more. A SCOTUS ruling or a landmark piece of legislation then marks a turning point in the issue area.
This incentive toward immobility may have helped in the early days of the republic, given how much everything was in flux. Although there was quite a bit of political activity, if only because there was no government following Washington’s election. The main issues may sound esoteric – a National Bank, a treaty with Great Britain, etc. – but they all dealt directly with the nature of the republic being established and had long-term ramifications for the nation.
That’s it for now. I may do a full retrospective when I’m finished (still another 100+ pages) but Washington is about to submit his farewell address – remember, no term-limits in 1796 – so there might not be too much of interest (to me anyway) left to discuss.
[1] Because it wasn’t confusing enough already.
[2] From Edmund Burke’s famous speech, “Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.” Whole text here: http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html. Note the date (1774).
[3] Cox has a really good book, Making Votes Count, if you desperately want to dig into the math and theory behind strategic voting and outcomes.
[4] To put it nicely.
[5] Grandson of the guy you’re thinking of and author of Common Sense respectively.
[6] Chernow rights specifically on this issue in an article from the WSJ in 2010: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704911704575326891123551892